Nietzsche, Stevens, and Derrida by Lee, Ilhwan
Nietzsche, Stevens, and Derrida* 
11-hwan Lee 
Oh, these Greeks! T h e y  knew how to live. What  is required for that is to stop 
courageously a t  the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe i n  forms, 
tones, words, i n  the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial -out 
of profundity. 
-Preface to  the second edition of The  G a y  Science 
Pilate saith unto him [Jesus), What  is t ruth? 
-John xviii. 38 
-Do I still have to add that i n  the entire New Testament there is only one solitary 
figure one is obliged to respect? Pilate, the roman governor .... 'What is truth?'  
-The Anti-Christ ,  46 
W h y  couldn't the world that concerns us-be a fiction? 
-Beyond Good and Evil, 34 
Heraclitus will always be right i n  this, that being is a n  empty fiction. 
-Twi l ight  of  the Idols, "'Reason' i n  Philosophyn, 2 
T h e  final belief is to believe i n  a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being 
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nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe in 
it willingly. 
-Adagia, Opus Posthumous, 163. 
1 
What is philosophy? Rather, let's put it this way: What should be the aim of philosophy? 
My answer to the question is that it should be the ultimate aim of philosophy to help 
3 
human beings live their lives more fully, namely, to teach them how to live. Viewed from 
this standpoint, Nietzsche, the philosopher after Kant and Hegel, and the true inheritor 
of the Greeks, comes closest to the aim. For what but the aim of ministering his teachings 
to the "common people" does Zarathustra "go down," despite the contempt and mistrust 
of the rabble (hence, Nietzsche's refutation of "herd animal moralityn and of political and 
social institutions or organizations like democracy or socialism-see BGE, 202 and 203; 
"The loathing of mankind, of the rabble, was always my greatest danger*, says Nietzsche 
in EH, "Why I Am Wise," 2) and his recognition that his down-going is too early for 
them (Nietzsche calls himself "untimely", "posthumous", and his philosophy a "Philosophy 
of the Futuren) ? 
Nietzsche is at first a pessimist under the influence of Schopenhauer. He nauseates like 
Hamlet and Roquentin, facing the purposelessness and absurdity of existence, looking at  the 
dark abyss of life. All Nietzsche does try to do can be interpreted as the will to transcend 
this desperate state. He is so eager "to stay cheerfuln (the very first phrase of TI)  and 
so eager to fly like a bird. Nietzsche's flight absolutely corresponds to Freud's trope of 
defense-flight from Thanatos to Eros. Nietzsche says, "There are heights of the soul 
from which even tragedy ceases to look tragic" (BGE, 30). The Birth of Tragedy is his 
first sermon on the heights. 
Nietzsche finds an  exit from the Schopenhauerian pessimism through the Greek tragic 
artists. I n  1886, fourteen years after the first publication of The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche added a subtitle, "Hellenism and Pessimism". "One must first of all deny 
Schopenhauer" (TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Mann, 36).  How could Nietzsche 
clinamen from his precursor and set himself up as the first voice of a new thinking? By 1 
interpreting Greek tragedy as the extreme antipodes of pessimism. Nietzsche explains 
pessimism, "Conscious of the truth he has once seen, man now sees everywhere only the 
horror or absurdity of existence" (BT, 7). What is the truth man has seen? It is that + 
"No one is accountable for existing at all, .... He is not the result of a special design, a 
will, a purpose" (TI, "The Four Great Errors", 8). (Here Nietzsche stands against 
teleology as Spinoza does.) But this horrible recognition is, really paradoxically, the final 
step for a great rebirth. At that point, "art approaches as a saving sorceressn (BT, 7). 
Tragedy is an affirmation "of all that is questionable and strange in existence" (EH,  h he 
Birth of Tragedy", 2). This crucial phrase is once more found in Twilight of the Idols: 
'The tragic artist is not a pessimist -it is precisely he who afirms all that is questionable 
and terrible in existence, he is Dionysiann ("'Reason' in Philosophyw, 6). ("Dionysianw 
here signifies the union of the "Apollinian" and "Dionysiann of The Birth of Tragedy). 
Nietzsche contrasts such tragic thinking and attitude with Socratic optimism which 
"drives music out of tragedy with the scourge of its syllogisms; that is, it destroys the 
essence of tragedy, which can be interpreted only as a manifestation and projection into 
images of Dionysian states, as the visible symbolizing of music, as the dream-world of a 
Dionysian intoxication" (BT, 14). Socratic optimism is "the unshakable faith that thought, 
using the thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being and that thought 
is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it" (BT, 15) and that "reason 
equals virtue equals happiness" (TI "The Problem of Socrates", 4). But this is a 
"profound" and "sublime" metaphysical illusion. Nietzsche says, "the way of this world is 
anything but divine; even by human standards it is not rational, merciful, or just. We  
know it well, the world in which we live is ungodly, immoral, 'inhuman'" (GS, 346). 
No one is accountable for the way of the world as well as his existing at all. Reason is 
helpless before the irrationality, inhumanity, purposelessness, de~i~nlessness of our existence 
in the world. Socratic optimistic belief in reason is really a "sublime" illusion. (HOW good 
would it be if everything could be accounted for by reason?) As we shall see later, this 
clinamen of Nietzsche's from Socrates is reflected in Jacque Derrida's critique of logocentrism 
and Wallace Stevens' aphorism, "Poetry must be irrational" (OP, 162). 
This line of Nietzsche's thought can be labeled as pessimistic and Schopenhauerian. 
But as we have noted above, he swerves from Schopenhauer whose philosophy, he thinks, 
is dicadent and life-negating, and finds his consolation in Greek tragedy. So, he divides 
pessimism into two: Dionysian pessimism and Christian pessimism (see GS, 370). 
Schopenhauer's philosophy is a kind of Christian pessimism which, dicadent, is nihilistic 
and hostile to life (see esp. BGE, 56 and AC, 7). (It is really amusing to think of the 
fact that Nietzsche calls Christianity nihilistic and some critics of Nietzsche call him 
nihilistic). On the contrary, Dionysian pessimism is the tragic philosophy which affirms 
life and embraces all the unaccountable (hence, his amor fa t i ) .  (Some people, who are 
puzzled by the phrase "Dionysian pessimism" because Nietzsche says, "The tragic artist 
is not a pessimist", will think him inconsistent. But the sentence must be read as: The 
tragic artist is not a Christian pessimist). 
I t  is a well-known fact that Nietzsche rebels against Christianity. In  sum, there are 
three interrelated reasons for his opposition to Christianity. One is that Christianity is 
nihilistic and life-negating. Christianity is a denial of the possibility of brilliant life on 
this earth. Nietzsche's curt aphorism, as usual, sums up the whole: "The Christian 
resolve to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad" (GS, 130). 
Another reason is connected with "the will to power" which Nietzsche believes is the 
single basic psychological force causing all human behaviours. Christianity is a merLdacity 
of the weak people who cannot fulfil their will to Kower on this earth and hope to fulfil' 
it on the purely imaginary world. The Last Judgment, like the socialist revolution, is the 
weak's ressentiment CNietzsche's favorite French word together with d6cadent). 
The other reason is associated with Nietzsche's attack on one of the "human, all-too- 
human" foibles, the tendency toward idealism-the tendency to fabricate purely imagirary 
beings atnd things. Plato's philosophy which presupposes the world of Idea is a typical 
case in point. Nietzsche asserts, "the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all 
errors so far was a dogmatist's error-namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the 
good as such* and goes on to say, "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'" (BGE, 
"Preface"). Here is Nietzsche at his most forceful: "In Christianity neither morality nor 
religion come into contact with reality at any point. Nothing but imaginary causes ('God,' 
'soul,' 'ego.,' 'spirit,' 'freewill,'-or 'unfree will') : nothing but imaginary effects ('sin,' 
'redemption,' 'grace,' 'punishment,' 'forgiveness of sins'). A traffic between imaginary 
6eings ('God, 'spirits,' 'souls') ; an imaginary natural science (anthropocentric; complete 
lack of the concept of natural causes); an  imaginary psychology (nothing but self- 
misunderstandings, interpretations of pleasant or unpleasant general feelings, for example 
the condition of the nervus sympathicus, with the aid of the signlanguage of religio-moral 
idiosyncracy-'repentance,' 'sting of conscience,' 'temptation by the Devil,' 'the proximity 
of God'); an imaginary teleology ('the kingdom of God,' 'the Last Judgment,' 'eternal 
life')" (AC, 15). 
Now it has become clear for Nietzsche what he has to do. He has to preach the 
possibility of brilliant life on this earth. His teachings ought to be those of joy and 
happiness. "Life has not disappointed men says Nietzsche in The Gay  Science, 324. "I am 
the reverse of a negative spirit. I am a joyful herald ..." (EH, "Why I Am a Fatality,"l) ; 
"to share not suffering but joy" (GS, 338); "some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayern 
(GS, 276); "bring light to the earth, be 'the light of the earth'!,, (GS, 293). And in 
one of the unforgettable phrases he says, "Pardon me, my friends, I have ventured to 
paint my happiness on the wall* (GS, 56). 
T o  know joy and happiness man should be the free spirit beyond all human errors. 
and prejudices. The  free spirit is the opposite of the spirit of gravity. Nietzsche prefers 
flying like a bird to delving like a mole. He says in Thus. Spoke Zarathustra, "And 
especially bird-like is that I am enemy to the Spirit of Gravity: and truly, mortal enemy, 
arch-enemy, born enemy!" ("Of the Spirit of Gravity," 1). While the spirit, of gravity is 
quasi-serious, solemn, and quasi-profound, the free spirit is flighty, dancing, and playful. 
I n  Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche declares, "I should believe only in a God who 
understood how to dance" ("Of Reading and Writing"). "A man's maturity-consists in  
having found again the seriousness one had as a. child,, at  playn (BGE, 94J. And he calls 
play "a sign of greatness:. (EH,. "Why I Am. So Clever," 10). 
In  Ecce Homo Nietzsche says, "I would much rather be a clown. Perhaps I am a clown .... 
I am the voice of truthn (Why I Am a Fatality," 1). Nietzsche's ultimate paradox is 
that truth is there is no ultimate truth. So he supposes truth is a woman. "What then? 
Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were 
dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the 
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been 
awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart?" (BGE, "Preface") 
The free spirit, who recognizes the non-existence of the ultimate truth and perceives the 
clumsiness and uselessness of would-be serious and profound efforts to delve and find it, 
stops at  the surface to dance and play. This is the meaning of "superficial-out of 
profundity." (Some people call Nietzsche's thought that there is no ultimate truth nihilistic. 
As is shown, it is Nietzche's power to turn this prima facie nihilism to his advantage.) 
The final lesson of the free spirit is learn to laugh-laughter as a symbol of joyous 
affirmation of life. What does kill the Spirit of Gravity is not anger but laughter. 
Nietzsche says of the Higher Man, "This laugher's crown, this rose-wreath crown: to you, 
my brothers, do I throw this crown! I have canonized laughter; you Higher Men, learn- 
to laugh!" (TSZ, "Of the Higher Man," 20) (This phrase is quoted by Nietzsche himself 
in "Attempt at a Self-criticism" which was added to the new edition of The Birth of 
Tragedy.) And in one of his maxims he writes, "he who laughs best today will also laugh 
last* (TI, "Maxims and Arrows," 43). 
As we have seen above, the surface and appearance are the only reality for Nietzsche. 
One of the human errors so far is that they have tried to penetrate the surface and find 
the essence or reality which they think is hidden below the surface. But this is not only 
a human error but a human vanity and arrogance. Nietzsche says, "It is no more than a 
moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance" (BGE, 24). I n  Twilight 
of the Idols he summarizes: "To divide the world into a 'real' and an  'apparent' world, 
whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of Kant [...I is only a suggestion 
of dtkadence-a symptom of declining life .... That the artist places a higher value on 
appearance than on reality constitutes no objection to this proposition. For 'appearance' 
here signifies reality once more, only selected, strengthened, corrected" ("'Reason' in 
Philosophy," 6). Dance on the surface-this is Nietzsche's figure of the free spirit. Here 
is a rime by Nietzsche: 
Smooth ice 
is paradise 
for those who dance with expertise. 
(GS, "Joke, Cunning, and Revenge," 13) 
Nietzsche's recognition of there being no ultimate truth or essence and his presentation 
of dancing o n  the surface leads to  the crucial thinking that what can be thought by human 
beings must be fiction. T h e  world, the object of our perception and thinking, must be fiction 
and our being i n  the world-that is, our life-must be fiction, too. I t  is just like a dream 
experience. And as  dreams are very free and very arbitrary interpretations of a n  unknown 
text, so all of our so-called truths and knowledges are interpretations added to a fictitious 
text to  our wishes and  needs (cf. GS, 54). T h e  following long and important passages 
a re  from the 119th section of The Dawn. 
Our dreams have this very value and meaning to ccmpensate to a certain degree this accidental 
lack of "nourishment" during the day. Why was the dream of yesterday full of tendrness and 
tears, that of the day before jocular and exuberant, a former one adventurous ... ? Why do I 
enjoy in this one indescribable beauties of music, why do I float and fly in another with the 
rapture of an eagle up toward distant mountain peaks? These fictions, which give play to and 
permit the discharge of, our drives of tenderness or jocularity or adventurousness, or our 
demand for music and mountains-and everybody will have his own better examples at hand- 
are interpretations of our nerve stimulations during dreams, very free, very arbitrary interpreta- 
tions .... That this text, which remains after all generally much the same in one night as in 
another, is yet annotated so variously; that the inventing reason imagines such various causes 
for the same nerve stimulations today and yesterday-that is due to the fact that the prompter 
of this reason was a different one today than yesterday: another drive wanted to satisfy, exert, 
exercise, refresh, and discharge itself-today one drive is at its high tide, and yesterday it was 
another one. Waking life does not have this same freedom of interpretation as in dreams ... but 
need I elaborate that our drives, when we are awake, also do nothing else than interpret nerve 
stimulations and posit "causes" according to their requirements? That between waking and 
dreaming there is no essential difference? ... That even our moral judgments and valuations are 
only pictures and phantasies about a physiological process which is unknown to us ... ? That all 
our so-called consciousness is a more or less phantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps 
unknowable, but felt text? 
So, if all is interpretation which can be i n  no way considered the t ruth and that's the 
most human beings can do, the more varied and lively its style the better. "To  communi- 
cate a state, a n  inner tension of pathos by means of signs, including the tempo of these 
signs-this is the meaning of every style; ... all rhetoric is merely the ar t  of gesture," says 
Nietzsche i n  Ecce Homo ("Why I Write Such Excellent Books?" 4).  And he makes i t  
clear that the higher man is one who uses signs gangasrotagati (which means "as the 
current of the Ganges moves") (BGE, 27) and presents "the most serious matters i n  a 
boisterous allegrissimo (the meaning of "extremely brisk and lively manner"]" (BGE, 28). 
I n  The Gay Science he puts forward like this: "One thing is needful-To 'give style' to  
one's character-a great and rare art!" (290) Think,  act, and live i n  a bold, lively, a n d  
rapid tempo and enjoy living your life-this is one of Nietzsche's final teachings. Become 
an artistic philosopher! Become dancing Socrates! 
I have found that Nietzsche's thoughts are without any significant change echoed in  
those of Wallace Stevens and Jacque Derrida, though I must admit that I am more likely 
to misunderstand Stevens and Derrida than Nietzsche. 
Stevens wrote in  one of his letters as if nonchalantly, "About Nietzsche: I haven't read 
him since I was a young man" (LWS, 409). When someone compared his poetry to that 
of French symbolists, especially Mallarm6, he denied the influence of Mallarm6. (See 
especially Stevens' letter to Bernard Heringman, dated May 3, 1949. ) Every poet likes to 
assume to be born full-blown from Zeus's head. This is Bloom's anxiety of strong poets. 
Take a glance at the phrases Stevens used when referring to Nietzsche: "the epatant," 
"a little bit too much to drink" (LWS, 432); "the sharp edges and intensity of speech" 
(LWS, 462) ; "formidable poetry" ("A Collect of Philosophy," OP, 187). His interest in 
Nietzsche manifests itself in his order for a complete set of Nietzsche which consisted of 
over 20 volumes. 
Stevens, I do think, is the poet who was very concerned with how to live on this earth 
bereft of God, that is, bereft of what can be considered to be the ultimate truth. He 
wrote, "I took a look at  Ideas of Order the other night to see whether there was any 
single poem in it that I prefered to all the others. If there is, it seems to be 'How to 
Live. What to Do.' I like it most, I suppose, because it so definitely represents my way 
of thinking" (LWS, 293). Aren't "the great height of the rockn and "heroic sound/ 
Joyous and jubilant and sure" nothing but Stevens' metaphors for Nietzsche's flight and 
joyous music? 
For Stevens, "the theory/Of poetry is the theory of life" ("An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven," CP, 486) and the poet's role is "to help people to live their lives" ("The 
Noble Rider and the Sound of Words," NA, 30), but not in a social, sociological, or 
political sense. He is a metaphysical poet. If not an  artistic philosopher, he is a 
philosophic artist. 
"The great poems of heaven and hell have been written and the great poem of the 
earth remains to be written" says Stevens ("Imagination as Value," NA, 142). Stevens' 
points are summed up like these: how we should live our lives on this earth which is the 
one and only field offered us (Nietzsche's turn of thought after destroying Christianity); 
"Death is the mother of beauty" ("Sunday Morning," CP, 68, 69) because it, by being 
there, paradoxically makes people embrace life more fully (Nietzsche's tragic, life-affirming 
thinking); but the world as the ground of living is unconnected, disorderly, routine, and 
disillusive, and thus, the necessity of creative imagination for making the world orderly, 
luxuriant, and colorful (Nietzsche's emphasis on style); poetry comes to our final rescue 
so that we can live our lives more joyfully and happily (Nietzsche's urging to be artistic 
and his claim to the philosophy of joy and happiness)- in short, like Nietzsche's flow 
of thinking, (in words which ring like Nietzsche's own) "After the final no there comes 
a yes" ("The Well-Dressed Man with a Beard," CP, 247). Stevens' own sayings serve to  
our purpose: "The highest pursuit of happiness on .earthn; "The purpose of poetry is SO 
contribute to man's happiness"; poetry "is itself a search for happiness"; "Poetry is the 
gaiety of language" ("Adagia," OP, 157,168,171,174). 
And like Nietzsche, Stevens thinks that what can be thought by men must be fiction. 
Religion, philosophy, and poetry are all fictions. When the sayings and systems of religion 
and philosophy which are believed to be true turn out fasle, they give us great despair. 
But poetry, by declaring at the beginning its fictitiousness, gives us pleasure to go on 
living. Stevens speaks, "In the long run the truth does not matter" ("Adagia," OP, 180). 
Poetry, as "an illumination of a surface," is a supreme fiction when it is suprarational 
and suprahuman and dances on the surface in various manners and gives joy. (I replace 
Stevens' three notes by Nietzschean terms.) 
Stevens mentions Nietzsche in one of his poems called "Description without Place." This 
is a poem good for inquiring into Stevens' thoughts on poetry. But from now on I will 
focus my attention on interpreting Notes toward a Supreme Fiction (CP, 3 8 0 ~ 4 0 8 )  as a 
variation of Nietzschean themes. 
Here is the prolog.ue of the poem: 
And for what, except for you, do I feel love? 
Do I press the extremest book of the wisest man 
Close to me, hidden in me day and night? 
In the uncertain light of single, certain truth, 
Equal in living changingness to the light 
In which I meet you, in which we sit at rest, 
For a moment in the central of our being, 
The vivid transparence that you bring is peace. 
Who is "you"? Which book is "the extremest book of the wisest man"? I am strongly 
tempted to suppose that "youn is Nietzsche and that book Nietzsche's work. 
The  poem springs from our wish to go back to and know the first idea. By trying to 
fulfil the wish, we can 
see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it. 
But 
Phoebus was 
A name for something tshat never could be named. 
And 
The first idea was not our own. 
T h e  first idea is simply either a thing which is not or beyond human reach. S o  
the first idea becomes 
The hermit in a poet's metaphors, 
Who comes and goes and comes and goes all day. 
I n  Nietzschean terms, the first idea is only a fiction and our desire for reaching i t  
reveals itself i n  our endless interpretations which have transitory ("For a moment") effects. 
And our being is only a fictional abyss. 
We are the mimics .... 
...... 
Abysmal instruments make sounds like pips 
Of the sweeping meanings that we add to them. 
So the poets become "the heroic childrenn (an echo of Vico?) who "decreate" t h e  
first idea [Nietzsche's advice: "destroy only as  creators" (GS, 58)]. T h e  poet is a major 
man, 
an expedient, 
Logos and logic, crystal hypothesis, 
Incipit and a form to speak the word 
And every latent double in the word, 
Beau linguist. 
I t  is h e  who "plainlyn (without the arrogance to  speak or minister truth) propounds. 
Like Heraclitus and Nietzsche, Stevens thinks this universe ever changing. T h e  sound 
of the bee is "Booming and booming of the new-come been and "Nothing had happened 
because nothing had changed." 
Two things of opposite natures seem to depend 
On one another, as a man depends 
On a woman, day on night, the imagined 
On the real. This is the origin of change. 
T h e  planter could not twang the banjo because he was "unaffectedn and the  sound of t h e  
birds "will end" because it is monotonous and "never changes." Nanzia Nunzio [the name 
reminding one of both Annunciation and nuncio (the Italian for "messengern)), the 
poetess of Western spirit, hears Ozymandias saying to her as if to Shahrazad of The 
Thousand and One Nights, 
A fictive covering 
Weaves always glistening from the heart and mind. 
This is a praise for the ever-changing fictional surface. (But I think we should not miss 
the tone of reservation in it.) I n  the final section of the second part, Stevens says of "a 
will to change* and writes, 
T h e  freshness of transformation is 
T h e  freshness of a world. I t  is our own, 
I t  is ours elves, the freshness of ourselves, 
And that necessity and that presentation 
Are rubbings of a glass in which we peer. 
Now at last, what poetry must do is 
On the image of what we see, to catch from that 
Irrational moment its unreasoning 
as when 
A dead shepherd brought tremendous chords from hell and bade the sheep carouse. 
What could this refer to but Orphic dance? 
There is an event that can be called an  overture of Canon Aspirin's "amassing harmony." 
The captain and Bawda married in Catawba which "was neither heaven nor helln at noon. 
Great noon-tide is Nietzsche's trope of supreme self-knowledge, and this can partly explain 
why the sun is so important a figure in Stevens' poetry. I interpret "an hour/Filled with 
expressible bliss" in which "I have not but I am and as I am, I amn as the hour of 
supreme self-knowledge in which one can be happy and gay. I n  the end, Stevens talks 
of a stage that is akin to the amor fati,  the affirmation of the necessity, the eternal 
recurrence: 
One of the vast repetitions final in 
Themselves and, therefore, good, the going round 
And round and round, the merely going round, 
Until merely going round is a final good, 
The way wine comes at a table in a wood. 
And we enjoy like men, the way a leaf 
Above the table spins its constant spin, 
So that we look at it with pleasure, look 
At it spinning its eccentric measure. Perhaps, 
The man-hero is not the exceptional monster, 
But he that of repetition is most master. 
I t  is the voice of the man who transforms the  fictional reality into plentiful reality and 
sings "Night's hymn of the  rock, as  i n  a vivid sleepn ("The  Rock," CP, 528). 
James Joyce, in  "The  Dead," the  last piece of Dubliners, describes Gabriel feeling inner 
joy .when h e  saw his wife on the  staircase and imagining a picture entitled Distant 
Music. A s  we  saw above, Nietzsche supposes t ruth is a woman and questions whether 
dogmatic attitude of philosophers is appropriate for dealing with a woman. T o  deal with 
: a:woman properly distance is required and then, you can move over the  surface and enjoy 
the  dance. 
Jacque Derrida, the joyful metaphysical dancer of our own time, puts forth i n  his recent 
work, ~ p e r o n i ,  "Le titre retinu pour cette sCance aura CtC la  question du style. Mais la 
femme sera mon sujet" (EP, 27). And h e  refers to  the sixtieth section of The Gay 
Science. I quote the  section i n  full because i t  expresses Nietzsche's own attitude i n  the 
most beautiful style. 
Women and their action at  a distance.-Do I still have ears? Axn I all ears and nothing else? 
Here I stand in the flaming surf whose white tongues are licking at my feet; from all sides 
I hear howling, threats, screaming, roaring coming at me, while the old earth-shaker sings his 
aria in the lowest depths, deep as a bellowing bull, while pounding such an earth-shaking beat 
that the hearts of even these weather-beaten rocky monsters are trembling in their bodies. Then, 
suddenly, as if born out of nothing, there appears before the gate of this hellish labyrinth, 
only a fern fathoms away-a large sailboat, gliding along as silently as a ghost. Oh, what 
ghostly beauty! How magically i t  touches me! Has all the calm and taciturnity of the world 
embarked on it? Does my happiness itself sit in this quiet place-my happier ego, my second, 
departed self? Not to be dead and yet no longer alive? A spiritlike intermediate being: quietly 
observing, gliding, floating? As the boat that with its white sails moves like an immense butterfly 
civer the dark sea. Yes! To move over existence! That's it! [my italics] That would be something! 
It  seems as if the noise here had led me into fantasies. All great noise leads us to move 
happiness into some quiet distance. When a man stands in the midst of his own noise, in, the 
midst of his own surf of his plans and projects, then he is apt also to see quiet, magical beings 
gliding past him and to long for their happiness and seclusion: women. He almost thinks that 
his better self dwells there among the women, and that in these quiet regions even the loudest 
surf turns into deadly quiet, and life itself into a dream about life. Yet! Yet! Noble enthusiast, 
even on the most beautiful sailboat there is a lot of noise, and unfortunately much small and 
petty noise. The magic and the most powerful effect of women is, in philosophical language, 
action at a distance, actio i n  distans; but this requires first of all and above all -distance. 
~ ~ e r o n  is a foremost part of the prow which plows the waves. 
Derrida effused his thoughts in 1967 through L'kcriture et la diffkrence, La voix et le 
phknonz8ne, and De la grammatologie. His central task is to critique what he calls 
"phonocentrisme" or "logocentrisme", which is at  the core of Western philosophy. 
Phonocentrism presupposes "proximiti: absolu de la voix et de l'Ctre, de la voix et du 
sens de I'Ctre, de la voix et de lYidCalitC du sensn (DG, 23). In  short, phonocentrism is 
idealism that believes in presence of the absolute being or truth (signified) which is 
expressed through and corresponds with the signs of voice (signifier), and it is a kind of 
superficial optimism that believes in the centering of human reason between signifier and 
signified (this is significantly revealed in the Greek word, logos, which means at once 
reason and word). On this basic philosophical ground can the concepts such as substance, 
essence, existence, subject, consciousness, intersubjectivity build their houses. But its 
disruption begins with Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, the critique "des concepts d7Ctre 
et de vCritC auquels sont substituks les concepts de jeu, d'interpretation et de signe (de 
signe sans vCritC prCsente)" (ED, 412). "Dils lors on a d6 sans doute commencer a penser 
qu'il n'y avait pas de centre, que le centre ne pouvait Ctre pens6 dans la forme d'un 
Ctant-prCsent, que le centre n'avait pas de lieu naturel, qu'il n'Ctait pas un lieu fixe mais 
une fonction, une sorte de non-lieu dans lequel se jouaient i l'infini des substitutions de 
signe", says Derrida and goes on to declare, "L'absence de signifiC transcendantal Ctend i 
l'infini le champ et le jeu de la signification" (ED, 411). 
Phonocentrism or logocentrism, by its idealistic nature, thinks of an  absolute being, 
namely, God, and by its own kind of optimism, believes in its being-present. So Derrida 
can say, "Le signe et la divinitC ont le mCme lieu et  le mEme temps de naissance. L'Cpoque 
du signe est essentiellement thCologique" (DG, 25). Here too, Nietzsche comes as a 
deconstructive force by liberating "le signifiant de sa dCpendance ou de sa dkrivation par 
rapport au logosn (DG, 31). The effect of the liberation is the intrusion of play in the 
field of signification. Derrida puts forth in a powerful apothegm, "le jeu du monde prCckde 
Dieu" (ED, 158). Play is the joyous affirmation of life and the world ("l'affirmation 
nietzschCenen-ED, 427), the affirmation of non-center. 
The thoughts that there is no absolute being, truth, or center and that it is an illusion 
that the existence of a word (or a sign) assures the existence of whatever the word refers 
to are essential to both Nietzsche and Derrida. The views on life are similar, too. For 
Nietzsche, life is an abyss and is likened to a dream; for Derrida, life is an  aspect of 
death (or death is an  aspect of life) and is also likened to a dream. But as we have seen 
in Nietzsche, this prima facie pessimism or nihilism is turned into the steppingstone for 
the higher affirmation of life. For Stevens, too, death is the mother of beauty. For Derrida 
as for Nietzsche, play comes as a saving force, and dream is the ground on the surface 
of which plays of interpretation can be done ad  infiniturn. For Derrida, writing is just 
that space, that playground. In  an important essay on Freud, he concludes, "L'Ccriture est 
ici la zBXvq comme rapport entre la vie et la mort, entre le prCsent et la reprhsentation, 
entre les deux appareils ... En ce sens l'kcriture est la sckne de l'histoire et le jeu du 
monde" (ED, 337). 
The notion diffbrence (difference, deferment) is crucial in Derrida's thinking. This is an  
apodeictic consequence, because play is the play of differences which defers meaning. The 
term can be traced back to Freud's notion of Aufschub (postponement) and Verspiitung 
(delay) by which Freud designates the inhibitory function of secondary process in the 
psychical apparatus. But we can find something similar in Nietzsche, too. Nietzsche sets 
the three tasks, one of which is learning to see, "learning to defer judgement .... the 
.essence of it is precisely not to 'will', the ability to defer decision" (TI, "What the 
Germans Lack", 6). In  Freud, it functions as a defense of the psyche (against death). 
I n  Nietzsche, it is the ability to defer decision, stand at a distance and be joyful and free 
on that deferment, on that infinite weavings of differences. These teachings Derrida now 
enriches and extends. Have your own style and live dangerously! 
In  the beginning of the essay I said it should be the aim of philosophy to help people 
live their lives more fully. I chose three men-a nineteenth-century German philosopher, 
a n  early twentieth-century American poet, and a contemporary French philosopher-who, 
I think, have taught us how to live in the postnihilistic world, not in the physical 
aspect-for example, diet, jogging, or entire sex-but in the spiritual, say, intellectual 
aspect, as Spinoza thinks the intellectual emancipation of neighbors to be the task of free 
man in society. 

